“Japan’s Real Oil Reserves Are Less Than Half of What Is Claimed”

 

“Japan’s Real Oil Reserves Are Less Than Half of What Is Claimed” 

In last night’s Ichigetsu Mansatsu program, journalist Akira Sato highlighted an important article by energy analyst Noboru Iwase published in PRESIDENT Online. Based on publicly available information, I have reorganized the key points below as a summary rather than a quotation.

The analysis is highly persuasive and extremely valuable.

1. Questioning the Premise: Is the “254 Days of Reserves” Really True?

The Japanese government and media repeatedly state that Japan has “254 days of oil reserves.” However, the Financial Times reports that Japan effectively has only 95 days of reserves. Iwase argues that this discrepancy arises from two issues:

• the true nature of what is counted as “reserves,” and

• the assumptions used for Japan’s daily oil consumption.

2. What the 254 Days Actually Consist Of

According to the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (as of January 2026):

Category	Volume	Days	Issues
National reserves	41.77M KL crude + 1.42M KL products	146 days	Oil type/quality undisclosed
Private-sector reserves	12.78M KL crude + 15.0M KL products	96 days	Likely “operational inventory,” not true reserves
Joint reserves with oil-producing nations	1.91M KL	6 days	Ownership belongs to producing countries; unclear if usable in emergencies

 

Total: 72.89M KL = 248–254 days (official figure)

However, most of the private-sector “reserves” are actually operational inventory required for normal refinery and distribution operations—not emergency stockpiles.

3. The Unrealistic Consumption Assumption: 1.8 Million BD

The government’s calculation implies Japan consumes only 1.8 million barrels per day (BD).

But BP/EI statistics show:

• 2005: 5.38M BD

• 2015: 3.99M BD

• 2024: 3.25M BD

Japan’s actual consumption remains around 3 million BD, making the government’s assumption far too low.

Correcting the assumption:

• 254 days → effectively about 152 days

• Excluding private operational inventory → only about 103 days

4. Private-Sector “Reserves” Are Actually Operational Inventory

Oil companies must maintain at least 60 days of inventory for stable operations. Thus:

Private-sector reserves = operational inventory, not emergency reserves.

They cannot simply be released during a crisis.

5. Joint Reserves with Oil-Producing Countries: Uncertain Usability

• Ownership belongs to Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

• Japan is allowed to count only “half” as reserves.

• Contracts are not publicly disclosed.

• Both countries lie inside the Strait of Hormuz, and their supply capacity is constrained during the current closure.

It is unclear whether Japan could actually use these reserves in an emergency.

6. Lack of Transparency in National Reserves

• The types and qualities of crude oil stored are not disclosed.

• Historically, Japan purchased large volumes of unpopular heavy crude (e.g., Khafji) for reserves.

• Auction details for reserve releases are far less transparent than in the U.S.

7. LNG Is Even More Critical: Long-Term Storage Is Physically Impossible

LNG must be kept at −162°C and naturally evaporates over time. Japan’s LNG inventory equals only 2–4 weeks of annual consumption. Unlike Europe or the U.S., Japan has almost no underground gas storage facilities.

8. The Core Issue: Government’s Desire to “Avoid Worrying the Public”

Iwase argues that Japanese administrative culture prioritizes:

“Small reassurance” over “large-scale safety.”

Examples include:

• The Fukushima accident’s independent investigation reached the same conclusion.

• The Basic Energy Plan devotes only two pages to public communication.

• TV networks openly say “energy issues don’t get ratings.”

As a result, the public hears only the comforting “254 days” figure, without understanding the underlying reality.

9. Conclusion: Japan Must Face the Reality of Being an Energy-Poor Nation

Iwase’s central message:

Japan’s real oil reserves are not 254 days, but 100–150 days at most. The structural vulnerability must be communicated honestly, and energy security must be rebuilt.

At the same time, Japan is a nation that achieved a miraculous postwar recovery through ingenuity and effort. Recognizing the facts clearly is the first step toward building better energy policy.