The proof is in the pudding:

The data reveals Takaichi's dissolution—the structure of a "landslide victory without a whirlwind."

Takaichi's dissolution is often described as a "whirlwind."
However, a closer examination of voter turnout, proportional votes, and vote structure reveals that there was no whirlwind.
Yet, the number of seats alone swelled to a "postwar record."
This contradiction is precisely the essence of this election.

1. Voter turnout was mediocre, and proportional votes did not "explode."

The voter turnout was around 56%, only a slight increase from the previous election.
It was not a historically high turnout, nor did it show any evidence of a large number of independents being mobilized.
The LDP's proportional votes also fell far short of the "explosive increase" seen in Koizumi's postal privatization dissolution (2005).
In other words,
the fact that the "Takaichi whirlwind" mobilized the public cannot be confirmed by the numbers.

2. The reason for the sudden increase in seats is "vote efficiency."

What determined the outcome of this election was not the absolute number of votes, but the efficiency of the votes.
The LDP won overwhelmingly in the single-seat districts and maintained its position as the leading party in the proportional representation system.
As a result,
the "institutional bonus" that inflates seats beyond the vote share was fully activated.
Furthermore, some have even pointed out that the proportional representation list was insufficient, and "they could have won 14 more seats."
This was an efficient win on the level of "winning too much and not having enough lists."

3. The surprise dissolution completely prevented the opposition from preparing.

The election schedule, one of the shortest in the postwar period, with only around 16 days between dissolution and voting,
completely prevented the opposition from coordinating candidates, unifying, and setting issues.
Anti-LDP votes remained dispersed going into the election,
creating a structure in which the LDP continued to win a "relative majority."
A surprise attack is a tactic that exploits the opponent's lack of preparation.
The recent election is a prime example of this.

4. Komeito's departure and the new centrist party split the "anti-LDP vote" into three parties.

Komeito withdrew and teamed up with the Constitutional Democratic Party to form the "Centre Reform Alliance."
However, this did not unite anti-LDP voters, but rather split them.
Votes were dispersed among the Constitutional Democratic Party, the centrist party, and other opposition parties,
prevailing a situation in which the LDP was more likely to win in single-seat constituencies.

5. The leading opposition party failed to define the issues.

The Constitutional Democratic Party and the centrist party proposed "sound-pleasing policies" such as:
• 0% consumption tax on food and beverages
• Livelihood support

But their core policies, such as security, energy, and fiscal policy, were vague.
As a result,
those who "dislike the LDP, but don't feel they deserve it" returned to the LDP or abstained from voting.

6. The "Difference" Visible in Comparison with the Koizumi Postal Control and Abe Dissolutions

Koizumi Postal Control (2005)
• 67% Voter Turnout
• Explosive Increase in Proportional Voting
• A "Genuine Whirlwind"

Abe Dissolution (2012/2014)
• Intense Disappointment in the Democratic Party Administration
• Clear Issues (Continuing Abenomics)

Takaichi Dissolution (This Time)
• Voter Turnout Was Average
• Proportional Voting Was "Decent"
• However, the Number of Seats Was the Largest Since the War

In other words,
This election was not a victory because of a "whirlwind," but because all the conditions for victory were met.

Conclusion

The Takaichi whirlwind cannot be verified by the numbers.
However,
• A surprise attack
• The division of anti-LDP votes
• The efficiency of the single-seat constituency system
• The self-destruction of the opposition

These factors combined to produce the historic phenomenon of a "landslide victory without a whirlwind." Without understanding this structure,
it is impossible to correctly determine the expiration date of Sanaenomics.